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Abstract  
I study the effect of council size on municipal expenditures by using a rich data set providing 
information on Italian municipal budgets over the period 2001-2007. By implementing a Sharp 
Regression Discontinuity Design, I find a negative relationship between local government size, as 
measured by total expenditures per capita, and the council size. Similar results are found when I 
consider expenditures that are more directly under the control of bureaucrats, such as current 
expenditures per capita. Finally, I test the "law of 1/n" on pork barrel policies, finding again a 
negative effect of council size on capital expenditures per capita.  
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1.  Introduction 
A common issue in modern democracies is whether politicians allocate resources efficiently. A 
conspicuous body of literature has tried to understand how politicians make decisions, especially in 
terms of budget choices and how executive fragmentation (i.e. the number of spending legislators) 
affects governments' budgets (see Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; 
Baqir, 2001; Bradbury and Stephenson, 2003; Perotti and Kontpoulos, 2002; Per-Petterson-Lidbom, 
2012; Besley and Case, 2003). 
According to the fiscal common theory (Tullock, 1959; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), 
politicians, in order to obtain a greater electoral support, try to satisfy the needs of particular groups 
of constituencies to the detriment of the general community. In fact, government spending typically 
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benefits a narrow segment of the population, whereas taxes are distributed broadly. In line with this 
theoretical approach, Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) propose a model in which the 
appropriation of government spending for localized projects (secured essentially to bring money to 
a representative’s district - pork barrel -) plays an important role in explaining the relationship 
between legislature size and government size. They show that government spending increases with 
the number of legislative districts: since politicians try to benefit well-defined groups, such as 
voters in the electoral district, at general community expense, pork barrel spending as well as other 
distributive policies will lead to an increase in total government spending. Each legislator (or 
district) internalizes all the benefits related to the implementation of a particular project but, on the 
other hand, he (it) only internalizes a fraction of the cost (taxes are spread across districts). 
This result, often referred to “Law of 1/n”, finds support in a number of empirical analyses 
showing a positive relationship between legislature size and government size. In particular, Gilligan 
and Matsusaka (2001) study the relationship between legislature size and government size by using 
data on States in the US in the first and second half of the 20
th
 Century. They find that expenditures 
increase with the state upper chamber size, but they are not affected by the state lower chamber 
size. Del Rossi and Inman (1999) examine spending decisions for the American Congress and 
highlight how the support provided by legislators in order to finance public expenditures is 
negatively correlated to the specific cost borne by every single constituency. Bradbury and Crain 
(2001), using US data, find a positive relationship between legislature size and spending within the 
States considered, even though the effect tends to be stronger in unicameral legislatures. Bradbury 
and Stephenson (2003) empirically test “Law of 1/n” by using a sample of Georgia’s counties. After 
controlling for many factors that may affect local expenditures, they find the number of county 
commissioners to be positively correlated to the county expenditures. 
However, the idea according to which an increase in council size leads to an increase in 
government outflows has been criticized from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. 
Primo and Snyder (2005) show that results found by Weingast et al. (1981) are not robust to 
alterations of the standard model. In particular, they demonstrate that the positive relationship 
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between spending and legislature size is based on several factors, such as the type of good being 
provided, the costs of raising revenues, whether the local government has to share in the project’s 
cost with the central government etc. Once these factors are taken into account the relationship 
between total spending and legislature size might reverse and become instead negative (reverse law 
of 1/n). 
Furthermore, the empirical analysis supporting the idea of a positive relationship between 
council size and government spending may not identify causal effects, for example, because of 
reverse causality problems (government size may affect legislature size: a large public sector might 
require a large number of individuals involved in the budget-decision-making process). 
Recently some empirical studies have undertaken estimation strategies able to handle these 
problems. Nevertheless, results obtained are inconclusive. The mixed findings highlighted in the 
empirical literature might be due not only to different econometric techniques but also to certain 
country-level characteristics. In fact, as shown by Persson et al. (2007), the electoral rule affects 
government spending, but only indirectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party 
system and a larger incidence of coalition governments than do majoritarian elections. Moreover, 
the higher government spending in countries adopting a proportional system is financed to a greater 
extent with deficits (borrowing), than spending in other countries. Put differently, countries with 
proportional election rules tend to not only spend more than other countries, they also tend to 
borrow more to finance their spending.  
With regard to the effect of council size on government spending at local level, Egger and 
Koethenbuerger (2010) and Hirota and Yunoue (2012), by considering municipalities in the 
German state of Bavaria and in Japan respectively (where electors vote under a mixed electoral 
system), implement a Regression Discontinuity Design and find a positive relationship between 
public expenditures and legislature size. The same econometric strategy is adopted by Per-
Petterson-Lidbom (2012), who instead finds a negative causal effect of legislature size on local 
government expenditures both for Finnish and Swedish municipalities (adopting a proportional 
system). Overall, Per-Petterson-Lidbom (2012)’ findings stress how the heterogeneous effect of 
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legislature size on government size found in different countries is not related to the adopted 
electoral system, since in Finnish and Sweden municipalities, that vote under a proportional rule, 
the larger the number of legislators the lower government expenditures are. 
In this paper I present new evidence regarding the impact of council size on government 
spending using a rich data set on Italian municipal budgets over the period 2001-2007. To solve 
endogeneity problems, I rely on the exogenous variation in legislature size induced by the Italian 
law, establishing that Council size is a deterministic step function of population size. This law 
introduces a discontinuity in municipal Council size around some known thresholds of a continuous 
variable (population size), allowing me to implement a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design to 
identify the casual effect of Council size on local government spending. Unfortunately, the number 
of legislators within the Municipal Council is not the only policy that changes around the 
population thresholds: also Mayors and Executive Committee members’ wage varies 
discontinuously around the same thresholds that generate a discontinuity in the Council size. 
Since the wage earned by Italian Mayors in each municipality is not observed I handle the 
mentioned issue by adding some more control variables that provide information on the quality and 
experience of elected politicians. I find a negative and statistically significant effect of Council size 
on total expenditures. If the Council size increases by 1 unit, the total municipal expenditures per 
capita decrease by 0.6 percent. Similar results emerge when I consider as dependent variables 
current expenditures per capita and capital expenditures per capita. One possible interpretation for 
these findings is that an increase in the number of Councilors leads to a better monitoring of 
bureaucrats in terms of spending, mitigating the agency problems and heightening the efficiency of 
the entire local public administration. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 I present the institutional framework and the 
data I use. Section 3 presents the methodology. In Section 4 the validity of the empirical 
methodology is tested. In section 5 the main results are presented. Section 6 presents some 
robustness checks, whereas Section 7 concludes. 
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2.  Institutional Setting and Data Description 
In Italy, municipal administrations are involved in a number of important functions such as the 
management of public utilities (local roads, water, sewage and garbage collection), the provision of 
public housing, transportation and nursery schools, and the assistance of elderly people. Since these 
services have a great impact on citizens’ daily lives, voters are generally very interested in the 
composition and in the performance of Municipal Councils. 
 The main bodies within municipalities are the Executive Committee (Giunta Comunale) and the 
Municipal Council (Consiglio Municipale). The executive authority is assigned to a Mayor 
(Sindaco) heading an Executive Committee, while the Municipal Council is endowed with 
legislative power. The Municipal Council’s main functions are to supervise (with majority rule) the 
legislative activity of the Mayor and to endorse policies, such as the Municipal Development Plan, 
the Plan of Public Works as well as the Budget.
2
  
As shown in Table 1, the Italian law (Legislative Decree n. 267/2000) establishes that the 
Municipal Council is composed by the Mayor and by a variable number of Councilors, which 
depends on municipal population size.  
 
Table 1: Council Size for Italian Municipalities- Legislative Decree no. 267/2000 
Population Size Council Size 
Less than 3,000 12 
3,000 ˫10,000 16 
10,000 ˫30,000 20 
30,000 ˫100,000 30 
100,000 ˫250,000 40 
250,000 ˫500,000 46 
500,000  ˫1,000,000 50 
Above 1,000,000 60 
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In Figure 1, I plot Council size against population size in the neighborhood of the first three 
thresholds (3,000; 10,000 and 30,000 inhabitants)
3
. The circles represent the raw council size, while 
the connected points are the predicted values from a linear model of the number of Councilors on 
municipality size. As Figure 1 depicts, Council size is a step (or deterministic) function of 
population size, and in turn the methodology I can apply in order to recover the causal effect of 
interest is a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design as described in the following sections. 
 
Figure 1: Discontinuity in Council Size 
 
 
 
The Municipal Budget (Bilancio di Previsione) is the main instrument used to plan the economic 
and financial management of local governments in which all of the information on total inflows and 
outflows (Spese ed Entrate Totali) can be found. Total inflows are essentially divided into Current 
Inflows (Entrate Correnti), including Tax Revenues (Entrate Tributarie), Non-Tax Revenues 
(Entrate Extra-Tributarie) and Transfers (Entrate per Trasferimenti) and Capital Inflows (Entrate in 
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Conto Capitale), including Transfers of Funds for Investment projects (Trasferimenti di Fondi per 
Investimenti) and Mortgages (Assunzione di Mutui e Prestiti Obbligazionari). Current Inflows are 
usually used to finance Current Outflows (Spese Correnti), including expenses borne for a day-to-
day municipalities' management, whereas Capital Outflows (Spese in Conto Capitale) are usually 
financed through Capital Inflows.  
The Municipal Budget (Bilancio di Previsione) is the main instrument used to plan the economic 
and financial management of local governments in which all of the information on total inflows and 
outflows (Spese ed Entrate Totali) can be found. Total inflows are essentially divided into Current 
Inflows (Entrate Correnti), including Tax Revenues (Entrate Tributarie), Non-Tax Revenues 
(Entrate Extra-Tributarie) and Transfers (Entrate per Trasferimenti) and Capital Inflows (Entrate in 
Conto Capitale), including Transfers of Funds for Investment projects (Trasferimenti di Fondi per 
Investimenti) and Mortgages (Assunzione di Mutui e Prestiti Obbligazionari). Current Inflows are 
usually used to finance Current Outflows (Spese Correnti), including expenses borne for a day-to-
day municipalities' management, whereas Capital Outflows (Spese in Conto Capitale) are usually 
financed through Capital Inflows.  
My empirical analysis is based on a panel data set on municipalities’ budgets, provided by the 
Italian Ministry of the Internal Affairs, of approximately 6,576 local governments, over the period 
2001-2007. There is information on both Inflows and Outflows.  
Moreover, I have information on the identity, gender, age, education attainment and previous 
jobs of the elected Mayors, the Executive Committee Members and the Municipal Councilors as 
well as on the number of Assessors and Councilors within the main municipal bodies.
4
 
To control for municipalities’ demographic characteristics, I use the 2001 Italian Census of 
Population (Censimento della Popolazione Italiana). I observe the size of resident population, the 
average level of employment, the education attainment of the population, the proportion of people 
aged 65 or over and the size of each municipality area.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Expenditures per capita (ln) 6.70 0.46 1.16 11.26 
Current Expenditures per capita (ln) 6.33 0.38 0.85 9.83 
Capital Expenditures per capita (ln) 6.07 0.84 5.26 11.80 
Council Size 14.73 4.40 12 60 
Population Size 7,122.1 41,015.62 31 2,546,804 
Employment 0.31 0.16 0.18 0.63 
Education of Population 7.30 0.82 2.57 12.57 
Municipal Area 37.14 50.07 1 1,499 
Income 8,749.34 4,460.83 1,133.43 52,226.91 
Elderly People (>=65) 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.64 
Dual Ballot 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Executive Committee Members’ Age 42.77 4.04 27.25 62 
Executive Committee Members’ Education 12.27 1.7 5 18 
Mayor’s Age 47.98 9.03 21 64 
Mayor’s Education 14.24 3.56 5 18 
Source: Local Administrators Data set (1985-2011), Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs; Italian Census of Population (2001). 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
first three variables reported in Table 2 are used as dependent variables in my empirical analysis 
and give me information on the local government size, as measured by Total Expenditures per 
capita (with a mean of 6.70), Current Expenditures per capita (with a mean of 6.33) and Capital 
Expenditures per capita (6.07 on average) in log terms. 
As regards to the number of members within each Municipal Council, on average Councilors are 
15 with a standard deviation of 4.40. The quite small average council size highlights the small-
medium size of Italian municipalities (a mean of 7,122 inhabitants and average area size of 37.14 
square kilometers). 
The average years of education in the population are 7, the ratio between the number of 
employed individuals and the total number of not elderly inhabitants is about 31% and the share of 
population aged more than 65 is 20%. Finally, roughly 22% of municipalities in the sample have a 
population size above 15,000 inhabitants and in turn, elections in these cities are held using a dual 
ballot system. 
As far as the Mayor and the Executive Committee members’ characteristics are concerned, I 
consider variables that provide information about their quality and experience (education attainment 
and age)
5
. In particular, the average age among Executive Committee members is 43, whereas 
Mayors in the sample are 48 years old on average. Further, Mayors seem to be more educated than 
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Executive Committee members: the average years of education of Mayors (14) are higher than 
those of Executive Committee members (13). 
 
3.  Methodology 
In this section I discuss the methodology implemented for my empirical analysis. Since the number 
of Councilors within the municipal apparatus is a deterministic function of a continuous variable, 
i.e. the population size, as highlighted by Figure 1, I can implement a Sharp Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD).  
The idea behind the Sharp RDD is to compare municipalities just above the threshold to 
municipalities just below it: unobservable characteristics should not vary discontinuously around 
the cutoff and then the cutoff rule provides exogenous variations in the treatment “as good as a 
randomized experiment” (Lee, 2003). 
There are different ways to implement a Sharp RDD. I could estimate the effect of Council size 
on government size at each of the 7 cutoffs established by the Italian law and obtaining in turn 7 
different effects. However, this methodology would require a lot of data around the cutoffs. As a 
consequence, I use, as in Per Petterson-Lidbom (2012), a model allowing me to determine just one 
estimate for the effect of the Council size. More precisely, in my main analysis, I will use all the 
available data in the neighborhood of the first three thresholds using Imbens et al and Calonico et al. 
optimal bandwidths respectively and estimate the following model: 
 
[1]    log(𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) +  𝑋𝑖𝑡 + +µ𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
            
where the dependent variable, 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡), is a measure of government 
size in logarithmic terms (i use three different measures of municipal expenditures: Total 
Expenditures per capita, Current Expenditures per capita and Capital Expenditures per capita), 
10 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a linear function of the number of observed Councilors within the Municipal 
Council, and g(.) is a polynomial function for population size. 
Moreover, I add 𝑋𝑖𝑡 that is a vector of controls at the municipal level, including the area size in 
square kilometers of each municipality, the number of employed workers divided by not elderly 
inhabitants, the proportion of elderly people (i.e. people aged 65 or above), the average education 
attainment of resident citizens, measured in terms of years of schooling.
6
 I also consider province 
and year dummies µ𝑝 and 𝜇𝑡 respectively. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term of my model. 
A potential issue related to the implementation of my methodology is related to the fact that in 
Italy, as stated by the Legislative Decree n. 267/2000, the number of legislators within the 
Municipal Council is not the only policy that changes around the population thresholds. Also 
Mayors and Executive Committee members’ wage varies discontinuously around the same 
thresholds that generate a discontinuity in the Council size. 
If there is another policy that depends on population size and shares the same population 
threshold, the effect of the Council size is confounded with the effect of this other policy and might 
not be identified. Paying higher salaries to politicians, according to the efficiency wage theory, may 
affects the way they manage public finance by increasing the incumbent's payoff from being 
reelected and by increasing the quality of elected officials (attracting more skilled individuals). An 
opposite prediction emerges from the model of Messner and Polborn (2004) and Matozzi and Merlo 
(2008) where an increase in the salary a politician receives while in oﬃce decreases the average 
quality of individuals who become politicians. 
Since the wage earned by Italian mayors in each municipality is not observed and in order to take 
into account the potential identification issue mentioned above, I add another control vector 𝑍𝑖𝑡, that 
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provides information on the quality and experience of elected politicians
7
, such as the age and 
education attainment (measured by years of schooling) of mayors, as well as the average age and 
education level of the elected Executive Committee members for each municipality. These variables 
should capture any selection effects on observable characteristics, as shown by Ferraz and Finan 
(2011)
8
.  
 
4.  Smoothness Condition and other Potential Confounds 
The general concern with my identification strategy is the possibility that some other determinants 
of expenditures also exhibits a stepwise function or are discontinuous at the various cutoff points. 
The main assumption underlying my approach is that unobserved characteristics do not change 
discontinuously around population thresholds, i.e. the pre-determined characteristics of 
municipalities just above and below the thresholds are the same. Since information about 
unobserved characteristics of municipalities is not available, the focus is on observed 
characteristics, such as the average population’s level of education, the employment rate, the 
municipal area, the proportion of people aged 65 or above, the educational attainment and age of 
mayors and Executive Committee members. Figure 2 presents these municipal characteristics 
plotted against population close to the first three cutoff points. 
Each figure depicts population cell means of the municipal characteristic for the first three 
population thresholds (which represents 96 percent of the observations) along with the fitted values 
of a locally weighted regression calculated within each segment. The other cutoffs are excluded for 
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 This vector does not include information about partisanship of elected politicians and mayors since at the municipal 
level in Italy most of the parties (especially those in municipalities with a population size lower than 5,000 inhabitants) 
belong to Liste Civiche, i.e. they are not part either of left or right wing).  
8
 Ferraz and Finan (2011) examine whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political 
performance using exogenous variation in the salaries of local legislators across Brazil’s municipal governments. The 
analysis exploits, like in my paper, discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional 
amendment deﬁning caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population. Since both the size of 
the legislature and the amount of block grant a municipality receives vary according to the population cutoﬀ s, they take 
into account these potential confounds, by adding the amount of block grant and the legislature size as further control 
variables in their main specification. 
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presentational purposes. However, including these additional observations does not affect the 
results. In general, the figures do not show any statistically significant differences at each threshold 
point, and this reassures me about the random assignment around the threshold points (Imbens and 
Lemieux, 2008). 
Figure 2: Discontinuity in the Pre-determined Characteristics 
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Another potential threat to my research design comes from the possibility that other government 
policies are discontinuous at the same cutoffs. Although I find no evidence that other characteristics 
of the municipalities change discontinuously at these cutoff points, the amount of grants transferred 
to Italian municipalities by State and Regions might vary according to the population size, as 
established by the Italian law (Legislative Decree n. 267/2000).  
In Table 3, I present the results of an OLS regression, in which I regress the capital and current 
transfers (per capita) received by central government and regions on the population cutoffs
9
 and I 
control for municipal characteristics and for quadratic and cubic population polynomials. Again I 
find that the amount of grants provided to municipalities does not change discontinuously around 
the population cutoffs used in my analysis. 
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14 
 
Table. 3: Discontinuity in State and Region Capital and Current Grants- OLS Results 
    
Capital Transfers (State and Regions)   Current Transfers (State and Regions) 
    (1) (2) 
  
(3) (4) 
Threshold_3,000   -23.882 -23.612   -143.201 -137.586 
    (15.477) (15.853)   (114.766) (114.546) 
Threshold_10,000   9.2028 10.059   8.664 26.536 
    (10.004) (11.144)   (72.975) (72.662) 
Threshold_30,000   20.710 22.909   120.185 165.916 
    (14.734) (17.997)   (108.743) (114.521) 
Threshold_100,000   55.369 57.942   446.248 499.338 
    
(34.050) (38.678)   (330.610) (349,741) 
Threshold_250,000   82.465 74.468   556.395 588,607 
    (70.709) (55.968)   (399.134) (380,201) 
Threshold_500,000   129.691 48.630   1,245.027 -249,699 
    (136.548) (119.926)   (818.999) (1,178,134) 
Threshold_1,000,000   56.203 -9.837   679.114 -700,650 
    (70.633) (136.945)   (533.614) (958.512) 
              
Population Polynomial   Second Third   Second Third 
Municipal Controls   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Ex. Com and Mayors' Controls   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year and Province dummies   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
              
Observations   48,306 48,306   48,669 48,669 
R-squared   0.007 0.007   0.018 0.018 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted 
for potential clustering at the municipal level, are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
 
As a last specification test of my design, I present in Figure 3 a McCrary test that is performed 
by running a kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of the 
threshold (McCrary, 2008). If there are any discontinuities in the density function of the forcing 
variable at the cutoff points, one might be concerned that population size may be manipulated, or in 
other words if individuals have a great deal of control over the assignment variable and if there is a 
perceived benefit to a treatment, one would certainly expect municipalities on one side of the 
threshold to be systematically different from those on the other side. As Figure 3 shows, the log-
difference between the frequency to the right and to the left of the thresholds is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
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Figure 3: McCrary Test 
 
 
 
5 Empirical Results: Sharp RDD Estimates 
In Table 4 I report the Sharp RDD estimates, in which local expenditures are measured by Total 
Expenditures per capita and Current Expenditures per capita in logarithms respectively.  
In order to choose the correct specification of g(.), data has been analyzed and a linear or 
quadratic polynomial generally provides a good approximation.  
In all the specifications, I control for municipalities’ characteristics, Mayor and Executive 
Committee members’ characteristics and year and province dummies. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and allowing for clustering at the municipality level to account for possible serial 
correlation in the errors within municipalities, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). 
In column (1) in which I focus on total expenditures per capita, using Imbens et al. optimal 
bandwidth in the neighborhood of the population thresholds and I consider a second order 
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polynomial for population size, I find a negative and statistically significant effect of Council size 
on total expenditures. If the Council size increases by 1 unit, the total municipal expenditures 
decrease by 0.5 percent. Moreover, the magnitude and the sign of the Council size effect on total 
expenditures do not change dramatically in column (2) where I use Calonico et al. optimal 
bandwidth. 
I can justify my findings in this way: an increase in the number of Councilors within the 
apparatus leads to a decrease in the municipal expenditures, since the local administration becomes 
more efficient. This is the case when, for example, a conflict between legislatures and bureaucrats 
rises about the level of expenses: bureaucrats usually tend to prefer higher level of expenses than 
politicians. The idea behind this agency problem is that elected legislators cannot make all policy 
decisions because of time constraints (it is sufficient to think that some members of Municipal 
Council can work in the private sector too) and consequently, they must delegate some decisions to 
the administrative officials (see for example, Weingast and Moran,1983). The activity of 
monitoring and control of bureaucrats is costly and usually time-consuming. Thus, increasing the 
number of legislators may lead to a better control of the public administration and to an increase in 
its efficiency (Per Petterson-Libdom, 2011). Furthermore, legislators are the custodians of the 
“public purse”, and they become more efficient at their task as the degree of specialization in the 
legislature increases (Crain et al., 1985). 
In order to understand this agency conflict and consequently, how the efficiency of the local 
administration may be affected by the executive fragmentation, in columns (3) and (4), I replicate 
the same specifications as those presented in columns (1) and (2), but I measure the local 
government size by expenses that are more directly under control of bureaucrats, i.e. Current 
Expenditures per capita (as mentioned before they refer to expenses borne for a day-to-day 
management of municipalities) including, among others, operating expenditures. It would have been 
interesting to investigate the effect of Council size on operating expenditures, but no detailed 
information on specific items that are part of current expenditures is available in my dataset. To the 
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best of my knowledge, it is highly likely that bureaucrats have a higher decision-making authority 
on current expenditures than on capital expenses. 
Also in this case, the results show that the effect of the legislature size on Current Expenditures 
per capita is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent level (see column (5)). The Current 
Expenditures per capita decrease by 0.4 percent in case of an increase in the Council size by 1 unit.  
All in all, it can be concluded that the number of members within the Municipal Council is 
relevant to explain the variation in Current Expenditures per capita: an increase in the number of 
Councilors leads to a better monitoring of bureaucrats in terms of spending, mitigating the agency 
problems and heightening the efficiency of the entire local public administration.  
 
Table 4: Local Expenditures and Council Size- Sharp RDD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES Tot  
Exp  
per capita  
(ln) 
Tot  
Exp 
 per capita  
(ln) 
Current Exp  
per capita (ln) 
Current Exp  
per capita (ln) 
Surplus 
 (ln) 
      
Council Size -0.0046** -0.0048** -0.0044** -0.0041** 0.0781*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0043) 
Constant 5.543*** 5.709*** 5.219*** 5.372*** 4.433*** 
 (0.185) (0.135) (0.141) (0.102) (0.221) 
      
Bandwidth Imbens et al. Calonico et al. Imbens et al. Calonico et al. Calonico et al. 
Population Polynomial Second First Second First First 
Municipal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ex. Com. and Mayors’ 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,312 8,760 11,312 8,760 8,759 
R-squared 0.399 0.422 0.464 0.497 0.810 
Notes: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted 
for potential clustering at the municipal level, are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
 
To enforce the idea that a higher number of council members can improve the 
efficiency/productivity of the local public administration, in column (5) I explore the effect of 
Council size on the municipal budget surplus, as measured by the difference between total revenues 
minus total expenditures. Results actually show a positive and statistically significant effect at 1 
percent level of my variable of interest on municipal budget surplus: if Council size increases by 1 
unit municipal surplus increases by 7.8 percent roughly. 
18 
 
Furthermore, Table 5 focuses on the theory proposed by Weingast et al. (1981) in which pork 
barrel plays an important role in explaining the relationship of interest. Hence, legislators, following 
the logrolling and trying to obtain some benefits in terms of re-election, tend to implement large 
investment projects granting an advantage to some specific groups of citizens to the detriment of the 
general community. In fact, under the logrolling hypothesis, Councilors can use in a wrong way 
municipal inflows to build private roads, to fix sewage systems or to open new recreation grounds 
at the request of a particular group of constituencies. For this reason, in order to test the prediction 
of Weingast et al. (1981) model on the oversupply of public projects, Capital Expenditures per 
capita has been used as a dependent variable for two main reasons: first, this variable is widely 
considered in the literature as a good proxy for the size of public projects; and second, expenses 
related to operations of maintenance and implementation of public works are included in Capital 
Expenditures. 
 
Table 5: Pork Barrel Policies and Council Size- Sharp RDD Results 
 (1) (2) 
   
VARIABLES Capital Exp  
per capita  
(ln) 
Capital Exp  
 per capita  
(ln) 
   
Council Size -0.0117*** -0.0110*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0031) 
Constant 4.834*** 4.930*** 
 (0.170) (0.161) 
   
Bandwidth Imbens et al. Calonico et al. 
Population Polynomial Second First 
Municipal Controls Yes Yes 
Ex. Com. and Mayors’ Controls Yes Yes 
Year and Province dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 11,312 8,760 
R-squared 0.29 0.302 
Notes: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted 
for potential clustering at the municipal level, are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
 
 
As in the previous analysis, the coefficient of the Council size is negative and statistically 
significant at 1 percent level for both specifications displayed in column (1) and (2): an increase by 
1 unit in the legislature size leads to a decrease in the capital expenses by 1 percent. These results, 
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suggesting that there is no pork barrel politics in Italian Municipalities, are in contrast with those 
predicted by the Weingast’s model.  
 
6. Robustness Checks: Exogenous Variation in the Council Size: Mayor’s Wage Threat 
As stated before, the Council size is not the only policy that varies discontinuously around the 
population thresholds. Also Mayors and Executive Committee members’ wages change around the 
same cutoffs. To take into account this problem in previous estimates I have controlled for the 
experience and quality of elected Mayors and Executive Committee members. 
Unfortunately there are no thresholds at which only the Council size varies. However there are 
some thresholds at which there is no change in the Council size but only a change in Mayor and 
Executive Committee members’ wage. Hence, as a final robustness check, to enforce my idea that 
the impact of Council size on the municipal expenditures is not confounded with the effect 
produced by the Mayor and Executive Committee members’ salary, I focus close to the only three 
population thresholds that uniquely identify a wage increase, i.e. 1,000, 5,000 and 50,000. In 
particular, I use a Local Linear Regression (LRR) with Calonico et al. optimal bandwidth, where I 
regress all the measures of the municipal expenditures on dummy variables taking a value equal to 1 
if the observations are above the thresholds and 0 otherwise, and I control for municipality 
characteristics, Mayors and Executive Committee members’ characteristics as well as for a first 
order population polynomial. However, since the LLR, as stated by Lee (2003), usually requires 
very large sample sizes around the thresholds, I decide to not consider the 50,000 threshold because 
of observations lack in the neighborhood of the cutoff. Table 7 presents the results. 
I find that the coefficients on the cutoff indicators, that estimate the effect of the increase in wage 
at each threshold point, are not statistically significant for almost all the specifications
10
. I found 
just a significant effect of the increase in the wage on Capital Expenditures per capita around the 
                                                          
10
 The coefficient on the cutoff indicators is always statistically insignificant also when I choose different bandwidth 
around the population thresholds. 
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5,000 threshold. Moreover, the effect tends to be positive, so the higher the salary earned by Mayors 
and Executive Committee members, the larger the municipal expenditures. This gives support to the 
idea that the negative effect on municipal expenditures is due uniquely to an increase in the number 
of legislators within the municipal Council. 
Table 7: The Effect of Mayors Wage on Municipal Expenditures: LLR Results with Calonico et al. Bandwidth 
    Total Expenditures per        
capita (ln) 
Current Expenditures per 
capita (ln) 
Capital Expenditures per 
capita (ln) 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Threshold_1,000   -0.021 -0.027 0.064 
    (0.023) (0.019) (0.057) 
Threshold_5,000   -0.046 -0.014 0.238*** 
    (0.042) (0.019) (0.063) 
          
Population Polynomial   First First First 
Municipal Controls   
Yes Yes Yes 
Ex. Com and Mayors' 
Controls   
Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Province dummies   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   10,184 10,184 9,889 
R-squared   0.460 0.495 0.216 
Notes: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted 
for potential clustering at the municipal level, are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
A large body of literature has concentrated on how politicians make decisions, and how the number 
of legislators affects governments' budgets. The general results in the literature have shown a 
positive effect of legislature size on government size, although the source of variation used in the 
empirical works is likely to be endogenous (see Baqir, 2001; Bradbury and Crain, 2001; Bradbury 
and Stephenson, 2003; and Gilligan and Matsusaka; 1995, 2001. The only exceptions are the 
analysis of Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010), Hirota and Yunoue (2012) and Per-Petterson-Lidbom 
(2012), which find however mixed results. In this way, not only the theoretical model proposed by 
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981), but also the causal interpretation of results presented in the 
previous papers have been questioned. 
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In this paper I have empirically investigated the causal effect of legislature size on local 
expenditures for Italian municipalities over the period 2001-2007 using a Sharp Regression 
Discontinuity Design. I find a negative relationship between Council size and municipal 
expenditures, as measured by Total Expenditures per capita, i.e. increasing the number of members 
within the Council apparatus leads to a greater ability to control bureaucrats and consequently to a 
higher level of productivity in the public administration. 
There are strong reasons to believe that these results are internally valid, i.e. Council size is 
causally correlated to municipal expenditures, since the source of variation used to identify the 
effect of the variable of interest is exogenous. 
As robustness check, I test the Weingast et al. model (1981) on pork barrel policies, focusing on 
Capital Expenditures per capita. Again I highlight a negative and statistically significant effect of 
Council size on capital expenditures, used as a proxy for the size of projects implemented by 
legislators, showing that there is no pork barrel politics at the municipal level in Italy, and in turn, 
casting some doubts on the Weingast et al. model (1981). Furthermore, in order to reinforce the 
hypothesis that an agency problem in terms of spending could rise between legislators and 
bureaucrats, I have focused on expenditures that are more directly under control of bureaucrats, i.e. 
Current Expenditures per capita, showing again a negative effect of legislature size on government 
size at the municipal level in Italy.  
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